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As virtual and mixed reality (VR/MR) technology moves 
steadily towards general availability accessible descriptions 
of the surrounding theory is desirable. An initial focus on 
high-level concepts can provide common language for 
diverse teams, including artists, designers and engineers, 
helping them to quickly get a sense of basic principles and 
gain a familiarity with related research for further study. 
The concepts of synchronized reality and grounded 
simulation are introduced as helpful starting points for 
thinking about the design and development of mixed reality 
systems with optimal presence. This paper provides case 
studies where recent commercial VR applications are 
analyzed with the proposed principles in mind, in an attempt 
to illustrate to developers how to think about design of mixed 
reality games for optimal presence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the interdisciplinary field of game development no one 
can be an expert at everything and although a familiarity with 
theory concerning Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and 
human perception/cognition can certainly be valuable it can 
be a challenge to keep such theories in mind in the daily work 
[24]. Thus, any tricks to stay aware of basic principles can be 
helpful, providing starting points for deeper dives into theory 
as circumstances allow. The potential value of basic 
theoretical principles is particularly notable with novel 
technologies where more detailed and explicit guidelines 
have yet to be developed. Currently, the accelerated 
development of virtual and mixed reality (VR/MR) is an 
example of an area where new ground is constantly broken 
and a steady flow of new people are trying to find their 
bearings in connection to existing theory. 
A general understanding of the human brain is particularly 
important to interaction paradigms that target realistic human 
interaction, such as virtual or mixed reality  [15]. For 
example, the general principles of brain function described 
here can be taken as a basis for discussions relating to the 
sense of presence, often discussed in relation to VR [26]. 
THE SIMULATING BRAIN 
To inform design, basic principles should provide a useful 
common ground that can be expected to be stable over a long 
time, while at the same time being easy to keep in mind. One 
may take as basic principles 1) everything humans learn must 
fit into existing mental structures that are ultimately 
grounded in reality (as one knows it from personal 
experience), and 2) predicting and simulating potential 
futures is the basis for cognition. Strongly condensed, these 
principles may be formulated as grounding and simulation, 
or together as grounded simulations. Human cognition and 
the brain can be considered to be all about grounded 
simulations. In the words of Karl Friston, many theories of 
brain function can be united under the perspective of “the 
brain as a generative model of the world it inhabits” [4:135]. 
The concept of free energy may be difficult to take to heart 
unless you have a background in mathematics, but the core 
idea can be explained by considering the importance of 
surprises [4,5]. For any living organism it is of critical 
importance to avoid surprises and to minimize the risks they 
represent. The free-energy principle describes how such 
minimization can actually work in the brain and several 
theories of global brain function build on this mathematical 
approach to avoiding surprises [4,13]. For the purpose of the 
discussion in this paper the focus will be on the importance 
of predictions and prediction errors, corresponding to 
expectations and surprises. Note that these predictions are 
not conscious expectations but primarily correspond to 
subconscious low-level predictions in the brain. Prediction 
errors correspond to the surprises that need to be avoided in 
order to interact competently with the world and thrive. For 
example, we want to avoid systems where pressing the same 
button multiple times produce surprising results. 
Throughout their evolution, surviving organisms come to 
expect and depend on aspects of the environment that 
facilitate their survival. This corresponds to the evolution of 
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the needs that drive all action according to activity theory 
[12,18,19]. (For readers unfamiliar with activity theory, the 
references to activity theory in this paper can be taken as an 
example of how the simplified principles presented here 
provide entry points for further digging into comprehensive 
and established theory). Deviations from these expected 
states should be avoided: the prediction error, the difference 
of the current state from the predicted, optimal state, should 
be minimized. Put differently, the brain dreams of the perfect 
world and reacts to all differences between this “prediction” 
and the currently perceived reality by taking action, striving 
to satisfy the organism’s needs. 
This description of the free-energy principle serves to 
illustrate the connection between the principles discussed 
and core aspects of life and humanity. Human needs are a 
constant backdrop to everything we do, and to all interaction 
with tools or systems. Mindfulness of the connections 
between such basic statements and descriptions of how our 
minds are populated by dynamic simulations can support 
design thinking aiming to develop the computerized 
environment of humans today. 
The theories of brain function described here are still a matter 
of discussion. The account below aims to convince the reader 
that the presented perspective is promising and useful. We 
cannot, however, expect to convince skeptics in this brief 
format. For a more extensive introduction to the discussion 
surrounding this theoretical perspective we recommend a 
target paper by Andy Clark [3].  
MENTAL SIMULATIONS 
‘Mental simulation’ and ‘mental model’ are expressions that 
have been used in many theories. At this point, however, 
mental simulation should be understood as a general concept 
for describing how the human mind works, as suggested 
within the framework of grounded cognition [1]. Grounded 
cognition has been suggested as a high-level description of 
recurring trends in modern theories of human cognition. 
According to grounded cognition all cognitive capabilities 
need to be grounded in (i.e., based on and connected to) our 
bodies, our senses, and, ultimately, our external reality. Such 
grounding can be related to the focus on interaction with 
reality and internalization of activities within activity theory 
[12,18,19]. This connection is developed further below but 
readers familiar with activity theory may wish to keep it in 
mind.  
One of the fundamental ideas of grounded cognition is that 
all cognition is grounded in the brain’s systems for 
perception, action and introspection [1,2]. Mental 
representations are stored in areas of the brain directly 
related to perception and previous experience of interaction 
with associated phenomena. If someone thinks about “ice 
cream” this triggers activity in areas of the brain related to 
tasting, seeing and touching ice cream, that is, in areas related 
to internalized aspects of the real “ice cream” object. In this 
context, the concept of mental simulation is a generalization 
of mental imagery (deliberately imagining some experience 
“in the head”) to include unconscious and spontaneous 
triggering of simulations in the brain. As with the ice cream 
example, the idea is that when someone thinks about 
something (anything) this corresponds to triggering a 
simulation of how this phenomenon might be experienced 
and how one could interact with it. These simulations are 
based on memories of past experience that are recombined 
and reenacted flexibly depending on context. The simulated 
experience that results when thinking of an ice cream is not 
the same each time. Exactly what this thought entails 
depends on the full context, including bodily senses, needs 
and emotions, such as hunger or depression. 
In distinction to concepts such as mental imagery or mental 
models the concept of mental simulation has a strong 
emphasis on simulations as running. That is, the simulations 
should not be thought of (primarily) as data structures, rules, 
or stored snapshots of momentary experiences, but as 
something that works in essentially the same way as that 
which is simulated; something that can be interacted with. A 
mental simulation of a computer keyboard, for instance, is 
usefully imagined as an internalized version of a real 
keyboard that can be handled, perceived and interacted with. 
The rest of the brain, and other mental simulations, can 
interact with this simulated keyboard and rely on the 
resulting predictions of how a real keyboard would respond. 
This illustrates how grounding and predictions work together 
to create a rich description of human cognition. Higher order 
skills, like fast typing on a keyboard, are grounded in and 
rely on predictions of how a real keyboard would behave – 
Presence 
Three common definitions of presence are: 
1. The sense of being there in in a real place 
2. The ability to act there as if in a familiar situation 
3. The perceptual illusion of non-mediation 
In this paper we focus on the 2nd definition. Arguably, 
this is the most functional one. 
Grounded Simulation 
Briefly, two basic principles that permeate this 
perspective are: that new skills and knowledge 
necessarily build upon and fit into what is already there 
(grounding) and that predictions and prediction errors are 
play a key role (simulation). 
Synchronized Reality 
Efficient interaction with our environment can be said to 
rely on a synchronization between our subjective 
mentally simulated reality and the external reality in 
question, whether the external reality is physical or 
virtual. To facilitate such synchronization, phenomena in 
the external reality must be possible to “slot into” our 
subjective mental reality. 
predictions that can in turn be described as internalizations 
developed through interaction with real keyboards. 
In activity theory such internalizations are created through a 
developmental process whereby existing physical objects 
and activities can become internal, giving rise to mental 
objects representing potential outcomes in the real world. It 
is towards these potential outcomes, this vision of an object 
existing in a certain form, that activities are directed [21]. For 
example, imagining oneself the owner of a new house or the 
author of an accepted paper can be such driving objectives. 
These mental objects can be thought of as corresponding to 
mental simulations, and their importance is described with 
the principle of object-orientedness in activity theory. Both 
mental simulations and mental objects are grounded in 
interaction with reality and it is a fundamental tenet of 
activity theory that the human mind is dependent on human 
activity in the real world [17]. You are what you do, and 
without action, without interaction with the environment, 
there can be no mind, no consciousness and no cognition. 
This reinforces the idea that we should look at real-world 
activities to understand the structure of human cognition and 
brain function, and vice versa. 
PRESENCE IN MIXED REALITY 
The potential for creating a sense of presence, a subjective 
experience of being “there”, is one of the primary selling 
points of VR. In particular, the acceptance of a (partly) 
computer generated environment as real and familiar enables 
efficient interaction by allowing the user to use established 
skills like turning an object in your hand to investigate it from 
all angles [16,25,28]. This focus on the ability to act in an 
environment is particularly relevant to MR systems. It can be 
difficult to give a full description of the experience of a MR 
environment, but it should be clear that the ability to interact 
naturally in familiar manner with virtual objects in the 
environment is valuable. This functional description of the 
sense of presence can be related to the concept of 
synchronized reality [27]. Synchronized reality builds on the 
idea that being present in an environment is functionally 
dependent on a synchronization between the external 
environment in question (physical or virtual) and your 
subjective mentally simulated reality [26]. If the mentally 
simulated interaction possibilities occupying your mind and 
attention (e.g., what can I do with this virtual brush) match 
the interaction possibilities in the environment our brain is 
working in this context in a very concrete manner. 
CONNECTIONS 
There are many parallels between the principles discussed in 
this paper and established HCI theory. The examples given 
below are intended to illustrate the potential of condensed 
principles to serve as an entry point to and a bridge between 
established theories. Note that we do not suggest that 
condensed principles should replace more comprehensive 
theory. 
The concept of affordance is arguably one of the more 
widely known theoretical concepts within the HCI 
community. The concept originates from the ecological 
psychology approach developed by Gibson [7,8] but the 
common interpretation within HCI is somewhat simpler than 
the original idea. Donald Norman described affordance as 
the properties of an object that allows users to know how to 
interact with them, that is, as the clues users pick up in order 
to connect the object to a possible interaction [22]. In a 
grounded simulation perspective this corresponds to the 
activation of mental simulations as the clues are recognized; 
mental simulations that make it possible to efficiently 
recognize higher-level interaction possibilities grounded in 
such lower level “clue” simulations. 
Affordances have also been described as being perceived or 
actual [23]. Perceived affordances are interactions readily 
imagined as possible while actual affordances are all 
interactions that are actually possible (corresponding to 
Gibson's original concept of affordance [6]). It is possible to 
throw a chair, but it is generally not the first imagined use. 
Conversely, we have noticed how it is increasingly common 
to see (young) people trying to follow links by touching a 
non-touch-sensitive screen. This view fits well with a 
conception of mental simulations as continually simulating 
and predicting what could happen. Such predictions often 
correspond to perceived affordances and one may consider 
how grounded simulations develop, to further understand 
how such perceived affordances arise. The probability of 
each simulation depends on the context provided by higher 
levels and the most likely possibilities will result in 
expectations to check through actions and sensory input from 
lower levels. For example, it is very common that one is able 
to jump in a platform game. The nature of the game comes 
with a perceived affordance for jumping corresponding to a 
mental simulation that the player might try to push into the 
real world through action, an endeavor that will fail if the 
affordance is just perceived and no actual jumping function 
exists. 
The importance of the context or situation of the user has 
been recognized in many developments of HCI theory, for 
example in situated actions. The situated action approach 
stresses the value of considering the details of the particular 
situation of the user for possible interactions, rather than 
designing for some model of how people ought to interact 
with a system [29]. This fact is illuminated in the grounded 
simulation perspective by the realization that perception is 
completely dependent on the current internal mental 
simulations of the user; simulations that in turn are grounded 
in interaction with reality and all the details of the actual 
situation. New information must be in relation to users’ 
expectations and these are highly situation sensitive. 
In-the-wild approaches focusing on, for example, 
embodiment or ecological rationality also lend themselves 
well to discussion in terms of grounded simulations. The 
theory of ecological rationality describes how people often 
use simple heuristics to make decisions quickly [9]. 
Similarly, decisions based on grounded simulations are 
based on recognition and analogies, triggering reasonable 
simulations of complex possible futures to select between. 
According to both ecological rationality and grounded 
simulation principles humans often rely on only a few 
important cues, those that carry the most information in 
relation to current expectations and the corresponding 
simulations. As a related example, Hurtienne [14] showed 
that interfaces that match existing experience-based image 
schemas support better performance. This fits well with 
interaction that matches existing (internalized through 
experience) mental simulations. As for embodiment, 
grounded cognition is inherently embodied. Every cognitive 
function in the brain is grounded in connections to bodily 
state as well as perception and action, and both what we 
perceive and what we can do is tightly connected to our body. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
To reiterate, grounded simulations principles focuses on 1) 
human experiences as dependent on existing mental 
structures that are ultimately grounded in reality, and 2) 
prediction and simulation of potential futures as the basis for 
cognition. Thus, grounded simulation principles are well 
posed to provide guidance for the design and development of 
speculative and reality-based interaction systems, 
considering both the scope of human imagination and the 
reality-based nature of human competence. Current 
developments within mixed reality fit well into this 
description. 
When developing novel interactions, it may be helpful to 
consider how interaction can be expected to internalize into 
a mental simulation. Internalization of a new phenomenon is 
supported by two factors: the basic predictability of the 
phenomenon, and how well it fits into the pre-existing 
hierarchy of simulations and predictions. How well can it be 
simulated in principle and how may it find familiar 
grounding, in a human mind?  
Finding familiar grounding can be directly related to finding 
a place in the hierarchy of existing mental simulations where 
the new phenomenon can fit in. This fit into the hierarchy 
depends on both higher and lower levels. Higher levels 
correspond to the context of the tool, for example, the 
purpose and use of the tool in an activity. Lower levels 
correspond to an existing familiarity with the skills needed 
to interact with the tool, such as grasping a tracked hand 
controller or using it as a virtual laser pointer. New tools 
should build on existing skills if quick and easy acquisition 
of the tool is important. This factor is increasingly 
appreciated in recent developments within HCI, for example, 
the utilization of real-world skills in reality-based interaction 
(RBI) [15]. Finally, in order to quickly construct a simulation 
of the tool it must be predictable. Any potential randomness 
needs to be carefully considered and guarded against.  
By being mindful of hierarchical relationships one can start 
to consider how the familiarity and predictability of 
surrounding phenomena affect the continuous 
synchronization of a considered tool. If everything is familiar 
and predictable further synchronization will be hampered by 
a lack of prediction errors, that is, information. This is 
desirable for any interaction that should be transparent, for 
which the perceptual illusion of non-mediation is desired. 
Such interfaces should be as familiar and predictable as the 
designer can make them. However, phenomena that should 
be synchronized into the user’s mental reality should not be 
entirely familiar and/or predictable. Instead, one important 
design challenge becomes to add just enough unfamiliarity 
and/or unpredictability to support synchronization, while 
avoiding large prediction errors that may invalidate the high-
level context and trigger breaks in presence. 
Focus on user expectations 
It is worth noting that one does not need to know the details 
about how a user’s mental model is set up in order to take 
advantage of basic principles when designing interaction 
systems. Identifying what is familiar and what is predictable 
is valuable at each level and even if it is only done for parts. 
One conclusion based on grounded simulation principles is 
that the question to ask before all others is: what does the 
user expect? The principles presented in this paper, and the 
related research, gives support for the critical importance of 
this question, as well as suggestions on how one may begin 
to answer it. What expectations can, should, or must be 
violated, and how does this happen? If one understands the 
expectations of the user, in context, it is possible to guide the 
user deliberately by introducing information in relation to 
these expectations. Expectations are almost entirely based on 
previous experience, and what information reaches the user 
is based on these expectations. 
CASE STUDIES OF COMMERCIAL VR APPLICATIONS 
This section attempts to illustrate how the principles of 
grounded simulations can be applied to achieve the 2nd 
definition of presence, as stated above. Two commercial VR 
applications have been selected for this purpose: Tilt Brush 
[11] and PaintLab [20]. 
In Tilt Brush and PaintLab the user is allowed to paint freely 
in ‘mid-air’ by the use of systems such as the HTC Vive [31], 
that features sub-millimeter, 6-degrees-of-freedom tracking 
of controllers and head-mounted display. Both applications 
offer the user a familiar context (free-form painting/drawing) 
as well as a familiar set of tools (brush and palette). Thus, 
theoretically leading the user to mentally simulate a familiar 
situation. Furthermore, the HTC Vive controllers’ virtual 
representations strongly resemble their physical counterparts 
in a meaningful way - the shape of the controller shaft and 
button layout are represented virtually, providing congruent 
visuo-haptic cues. With this in mind, we can consider what 
the user expects to be able to do with the tools at hand in the 
designed context and how those expectations relate to 
potential presence in the VR application. 
The actual drawing is performed much in the same way as 
waving a sparkler in the dark [10], leaving a similar trail of 
light suspended in the virtual ‘air’, albeit less fleeting than 
the real world analogy. In fact, the default brush in Tilt Brush 
is aptly called ‘light’. The palette, whose virtual 
representation is more abstract than a traditional palette, is 
attached to the hand not wielding the brush controller and 
serves as the ‘toolbar’ common to many traditional painting 
applications. I.e., the palette mainly lets the user select 
different brushes and colors to paint with. 
The described interface components offer a basis for 
grounded simulations by using a highly congruent 
representation of the controller in the context of painting, 
which is arguably a familiar activity. By synchronizing 
certain elements in this manner, the developers can then 
attempt to expand on the concept of a palette by portraying 
it as 1) Tilt Brush: an abstract cube where each face contains 
a set of familiar toolbar icons; 2) PaintLab: a circle of 
abstract beads suspended just above the controller, each bead 
showing a sample of the paint it represents. In doing so, the 
application designers could potentially add just enough 
uncertainty to support synchronization, without 
overwhelming the user. In other words, the novelty of 
specific interaction solutions draw attention, and if they are 
just a little bit novel this attention is converted to 
understanding as the user interacts with the tool. By adhering 
to the principles of grounded simulation in this way, 
developers can provide an entry-point for users that may be 
completely new to the medium, which is arguably an 
effective approach to interface design in the advent of 
consumer VR. 
However, anecdotal accounts indicate that some users still 
have difficulties understanding certain mechanics of the 
abstract palette in Tilt Brush - such as rotating it around its 
vertical axis by swiping left or right on the controller’s 
touchpad. The rotation allows for more convenient access to 
all of the ‘palette cube’s’ faces. However, turning the 
physical controller in your hand is entirely possible due to 
the precise positional tracking of the system, although 
potentially less convenient. Another conflicting concept 
which may cause some confusion is that the user needs to 
point at an icon on the palette with the tip of the brush 
controller and then press the trigger button in order to make 
a selection. In the real-life analogous situation, paint 
selection is normally performed by the brush’s physical 
contact with a dab of paint on the palette. However, pressing 
a button conforms with the conventions of traditional 
painting applications, which, given the computer context, 
may provide some priming to the mental simulation. In this 
respect, PaintLab offers a closer visual likeness to the real 
world palette with its suspended beads of paint, and contrary 
to Tilt Brush, the selection of paint is performed without 
pressing the trigger, but by touching the paint bead with the 
‘pointer’. Considering grounded simulations the task then 
becomes to establish which of these groundings in previous 
experience, real world dabbing of pencils or button clicking 
to select colors in computer applications, are a better fit both 
to the expected users and to the desired actions. Which 
selection interaction provides a good foundation for 
simulations of continued painting (in space)? 
 
 
Figure 2. The palette and brush controllers in PaintLab [19]. 
Left: note circle of beads. Right: note pointer arrow 
intersecting the black bead. 
 
Figure 1. ‘Palette cube’ in Tilt Brush [11]. In the foreground 
the brush controller is shown selecting a color. 
 
Figure 3. Neko the virtual assistant in Fantastic Contraption 
[23] carrying various construction materials on its back. 
One particular feature of the ‘pointer’ on the brush controller 
in PaintLab is that it’s located on the side of the controller’s 
head, pointing perpendicularly to the controller’s orientation 
in the hand. This feature does provide a highly precise means 
of selection, because the tip of the pointer can be placed in 
full view with less repositioning of the hands. Nevertheless, 
the sideways oriented pointer can likely be considered 
unconventional and may therefore cause some confusion. In 
both applications the trigger on the brush controller also 
needs to be pressed in order to paint. The key difference 
between the two applications’ input methods for painting is 
that Tilt Brush’s trigger is binary, while PaintLab’s is analog 
– the more pressure on the trigger the broader the brush 
stroke. Neither method may be obvious to new users, but the 
latter may also be hard to make practical use of. In Tilt Brush 
the stroke width is set via swiping on the brush controller’s 
touchpad, which severs the direct haptic connection to the 
painting but, in turn, makes painting with a constant stroke 
width more attainable. 
To reduce uncertainty and promote synchronization, the 
trigger interaction in these applications could, according to 
the principles presented herein, be replaced with proximity-
based interaction (such as the drums in SoundStage, where 
the user plays the drums by hitting a virtual drum with a 
virtual drumstick. In other words - air drums!). In such a 
case, the user would touch the tip of a brush to a dab of paint 
on the palette (much like in PaintLab) and start painting by 
running the brush across a surface. The closer the brush - the 
broader the stroke. One apparent limitation of this interaction 
model is that painting needs to happen on a clearly defined 
surface and not in mid-air, in order to prevent unwanted 
strokes. However, unwanted strokes could be mitigated by 
taking a reductive approach to part of the painting process – 
one where the user would select an eraser (or paint remover) 
to trim any excess strokes. Conceivably an inconvenient 
method for situations where strokes are small and densely 
located, but nevertheless more grounded. 
Further potential alternative solutions to the present ‘palette 
cube’ and ‘brush controller’ paradigm could be to; 1) offload 
brush selection from the palette and represent the various 
brushes as actual virtual brush objects that attach to the tip of 
the virtual controller when picked up (such as the pens in 
Tvori [30]); and 2) reframe the meta functions (save/open 
file, clear scene, change backdrop etc.) to fit in the virtual 
environment cast as various virtual objects (such as the desk 
in Tvori, ‘save-room’ in Fantastic Contraption or the 
components in SoundStage). These changes would arguably 
clutter the virtual space and perhaps reduce efficiency for 
expert users, but would in return refine the brush and palette 
to more analogous representations - i.e. a palette with only a 
‘color picker’ and a brush whose representation is more 
congruent with real life brushes. Thus, perhaps increasing the 
accessibility for new users. Clutter of the workspace could 
be mitigated with a virtual assistant that keeps all the tools 
organized and always positions itself at a convenient angle 
and distance (like Neko in Fantastic Contraption). Another 
benefit of having virtual brush objects that users need to pick 
up is that there is opportunity to allow the users to reposition 
or realign the brush objects in their grasp, making it easier 
for them to find a comfortable painting angle. When applying 
grounded simulation principles to the design of virtual brush 
objects one should establish that 1) the virtual brushes are 
recognizable and presented in a familiar arrangement, and 2) 
that they can be predictably grabbed, avoiding, e.g., 
accidently grabbing the wrong brush or getting the brush in 
an unintended position in the hand. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary motivation for this paper is the value of 
additional theoretical entry points. In many cases, the value 
and usefulness of a theoretical framework depends on the 
background of the reader, as it must be integrated into each 
person’s pre-existing understanding of the world before it 
can be used efficiently to support thinking. This paper does 
not suggest a new objectively superior theoretical 
framework, but we are convinced that the concepts of 
grounded simulation and synchronized reality provide 
valuable entry points to game designers with varied 
backgrounds. 
  
Figure 4. Set of drums in SoundStage [24]. The user can move 
each instrument around to his or her liking. They suspended 
in space. 
 
Figure 5. Desk in Tvori [30]. Bottom: each icon represents a 
category of props and is located on drawer that can be pulled 
out from the desk. In it, miniature props are found, that grow 
to their intended size when picked up. 
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